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Abstract
We investigate the optimality of monetary policy targeting rules in a macroeconomic model based
on explicit micro-foundations for intrinsic persistence in inﬂation and real output. For the corre-
sponding social welfare loss function to be minimized by the central bank, inertia arises endoge-
nously in both the inﬂation and output gap stabilization objectives. In this framework, inﬂation tar-
geting closely approximates the optimal precommitment policy for empirically relevant parameter
values. Alternative policy rules, such as nominal income growth targeting, “speed-limit” targeting, or
price level targeting, do not perform as well. Previous research has demonstrated lower social welfare
losses with these alternative targeting rules; such ﬁndings are shown to be primarily a consequence
of assuming the central bank minimizes a simple social loss function that is not consistent with the
micro-foundations of a model with intrinsic persistence.
JEL Categories: E52, E58.
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Anumberofcentralbankshaveimplementedsomeformofinﬂationtargetingoverthepastfewdecades,
and an extensive amount of research has investigated this approach to monetary policy. Goodfriend and
King (1997) and Clarida et al. (1999) develop formal support for inﬂation targeting in dynamic stochastic
generalequilibrium(DSGE)modelsthatfeaturenominalrigidities. Thesubsequentliteraturethatinves-
tigates optimal monetary policy in such a “New Keynesian” or “New Neo-Classical Synthesis” paradigm
is vast; Woodford (2003) provides an extensive exposition.
Recently in this journal, Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) have challenged the desirability of inﬂation
targeting (hereafter “IT”) in a discretionary policy environment. When the effectiveness of policy de-
pends on agents’ expectations about future macroeconomic aggregates, such as inﬂation, the inability
ofmonetarypolicymakerstocompletelyand crediblyprecommittofuturepolicyactionscreatesatime-
inconsistencyproblem. Jensen(2002)andWalsh(2003)proposetargetingrulesthatcreateintertemporal
linkages in a discretionary environment, such as nominal income growth targeting or price-level target-
ing, as a means to mitigate this “stabilization bias.”1
Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) simulate the relative performance of IT versus these alternative tar-
getingrulesinasimpliﬁedmacroeconomicmodelthatentailsanimportantdeparturefromthestandard
micro-founded approach mentioned above: both inﬂation and the output gap are assumed to be func-
tions of their own lagged values as well as expected future values. For empirical plausible degrees of
inﬂation persistence, these authors document that the stabilization bias problem is exacerbated, further
driving a wedge between the performance of IT and the alternative targeting rules they investigate.
Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) introduced persistence into their modeling framework in a fairly ad
hoc manner. Recent theoretical work has provided more explicit microeconomic foundations that make
these persistence terms an intrinsic part of the model. For example, Fuhrer (2000) incorporates habit
formation in consumption to generate persistence in real output, while Steinsson (2003) shows how al-
lowing a proportion of ﬁrms to index their prices to past averages can yield a “hybrid” Phillips curve.
Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005) have integrated these sources of persistence into
more extensive general equilibrium macroeconomic models. In section 2, wesummarize a small, micro-
1For additional perspectives on stabilization bias, see Dennis and Söderström (2002) and McCallum and Nelson (2004).
Notice that this source of bias is distinct from the “average inﬂation bias” studied by Barro and Gordon (1983), which is not
present in the models examined herein.
1founded “New Keynesian” model with intrinsic persistence that closely resembles the approaches of Gi-
annoni and Woodford (2003), Woodford (2003), and Amato and Laubach (2004).
These authors have shown that the microeconomic behavioral assumptions that yield intrinsic per-
sistence in the dynamics of inﬂation and the output gap (derived from the log-linearized ﬁrst-order con-
ditions describing optimal behavior by the representative household) also impact the second-order ap-
proximation to the welfare of the representative agent. That is, the popular quadratic loss function in
inﬂation and the output gap — which has been utilized by Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003), as well as nu-
merous other researchers — is not appropriate for a model with persistent dynamics in either variable.
Recently, Walsh (2005) has studied how inﬂation persistence affects the derivation of the second-order
approximation to the social welfare function.2 In our model, the appropriate social loss function fea-
tures “endogenous inertia,” in which quasi-differences in inﬂation and the output gap appear in the loss
function, with the relative importance of these lagged terms increasing in the structural parameters that
generate intrinsic persistence. In section 3 we explore the differences between the common quadratic
social loss function and the speciﬁcation consistent with intrinsic persistence in the model.
Given this coherence between the model dynamics and the loss function, in section 4 we simulate
the consequences of different targeting rules under discretion. Two important and novel results emerge
from that investigation. First, variation in the degree of habit formation plays a particularly important
role, as it affects the dynamics for inﬂation and the relative importance of the output gap stabilization
objective in the social loss function. Second, we ﬁnd that inﬂation targeting often comes closest to the
precommitment ideal, once the model is calibrated to plausible degrees of persistence. The apparent
superiority of the alternative targeting rules that has been cited elsewhere in the literature can be traced
to the use of a simple, but model-inconsistent, speciﬁcation of the loss function. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Speciﬁcation
Below we brieﬂy outline the key dynamic equations that result from a micro-founded “New Keynesian”
model that features intrinsic persistence. Appendix A further develops the model speciﬁcation. For sim-
plicity, the economy is assumed to be closed, and there is no capital accumulation. The representative
household derives utility from an aggregate consumption good that is composed of differentiated inter-
2Walsh (2005) does not investigate the consequences of using a micro-founded social loss function for the success of various
targeting rules in mitigating stabilization bias under discretion, which is the focus of this paper.
2mediate goods, each produced by a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm that is owned by the household.
The household chooses its consumption and labor supply to maximize the present discounted value
of utility. Let γ and −η be isoelastic utility parameters for consumption and labor supply, respectively.
The parameter h ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of habit persistence in consumption; h = 0 returns a more
standard time-separable speciﬁcation in which only the current value of household consumption enters
into each period’s utility.3 Log-linearizing the ﬁrst-order conditions for the household’s problem yields
a variation of an Euler equation for consumption. In the presence of habit formation, lagged as well as
expected future consumption appear in the Euler equation.
Assuming exogenous stochastic processes for government spending and for productivity allows the
Eulerequationtobere-writtenasanaggregatedemandrelationshipintermsofthe(log)realoutputgap,
xt = yt −yn
t :
xt =θ−1xt−1+θ+1Etxt+1−θ+2Etxt+2− e σ(it −Etπt+1−r
n
t ), (1)
where it is the nominal interest rate (the policy instrument of the central bank), Etπt+1 is the expectation
of next period’s inﬂation rate, and rn
t is the natural or “Wicksellian” real rate of interest, deﬁned as:
r
n










t and e gt are transformations of the (log) natural level of output and the exogenous ﬁscal policy innova-
tion, respectively, and e γ=γ
±
(1−βh). (See appendix A for details.)
The coefﬁcients on the output gap terms on the right-hand side of equation (1) are reduced-form
functions of the structural parameters h, the degree of habit formation, and β, the discount factor. e σ is
a generalized representation of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution that is decreasing in h. Recall
that h =0 produces a standard forward-looking AD (or IS) relationship; in this case both θ−1 and θ+2 are
zero, θ+1 =1, and e σ=γ−1.
On the aggregate supply side, ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive price setters for their differen-
tiated products. We assume Calvo-type nominal price rigidity with α being the probability that a ﬁrm
does not adjust its price in a given period. We augment this speciﬁcation by assuming that a proportion
ω of ﬁrms who do not adjust in a period index their prices to the aggregate price level. This additional
3Consistent with Fuhrer (2000), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), and Amato and Laubach (2004), similar approaches, we
incorporate “internal” habit formation into our model in appendix A to generate persistence in aggregate consumption and
output. Dennis (2004) ﬁnds small empirical differences between “internal” and “external” speciﬁcations of habit formation.
3assumption yields persistence in the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve via a lagged inﬂation term:
πt =φ−1πt−1+φ+1Etπt+1+e κxt −e κ−1xt−1−e κ+1Etxt+1+µt . (3)
In the absence of price indexation by ﬁrms, ω would be zero and the coefﬁcient on lagged inﬂation, φ−1,
would be zero as well, while the coefﬁcient on next period’s expected inﬂation, φ+1, would be β.
Thelackofinﬂationpersistencewhenω=0,however,doesnotreproducethestandardNew-Keynesian
Phillips Curve: the presence of habit formation in consumption impacts the labor supply decisions of
the representative household, which therefore has an impact on production and price setting behavior
of ﬁrms in equilibrium. One important consequence of incorporating habit formation is the introduc-
tion of the lag and expected lead of the output gap into the above aggregate supply relationship. Each of
e κ, e κ−1, and e κ+1 are positive and increasing in h, heightening the volatility of inﬂation for any exogenous
shock to the model, all else equal. However, the cumulative output gap elasticity for inﬂation (that is, the
sum of the e κ terms) is declining in h. Only in the special case of intrinsic persistence in neither output
nor inﬂation does equation (3) reduce to a canonical forward-looking New-Keynesian Phillips Curve.
Equations (1) and (3) above each differ in important ways from an ad hoc speciﬁcation of persis-
tence, such as the models used by Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003). The stylized aggregate demand (or IS)
equation with ad hoc persistence takes the form:
xt =θxt−1+(1−θ)Etxt+1−σ(it −Etπt+1)+ut , (4)
in which θ governs the degree of persistence in the output gap; θ=0 corresponds with a forward-looking
IS equation that can be derived from the Euler equation for aggregate consumption in a micro-founded
model. Similarly, the aggregate supply (or Phillips Curve) equations typically have a “hybrid” form:
πt =φπt−1+(1−φ)βEtπt+1+κxt +et , (5)
where φ measures the degree of intrinsic persistence in inﬂation; φ=0 returns the standard New Keyne-
sian Phillips Curve that can be derived, for example, from a Calvo model of price setting. Both ut and et
are assumed to follow exogenous stationary AR(1) processes.
Deriving intrinsic persistence in the output gap from habit formation in consumption affects both
4aggregate demand and aggregate supply in the micro-founded model. The micro-founded aggregate
demand speciﬁcation of equation (1) features different dynamics and a more complex innovation pro-
cessthanequation(4). (SeeappendixAfordetails.) Buttheimportantdifferenceisinthespeciﬁcationof
aggregatesupply. Intheaboveadhoc modelspeciﬁcation, variationinthedegreeofpersistenceinequa-
tion (4) has no effect on equation (5). In the micro-founded model, on the other hand, habit formation
directly impacts the aggregate supply relationship in equation (3), as noted above. It also inﬂuences the
nature of the social loss function as well, as we discuss in the next section. Thus, monetary policy is af-
fected in important ways by variation in intrinsic persistence in output, due to variation in the degree of
habit persistence. Such a relationship does not occur with the ad hoc model: Jensen (2002), for example,
emphasizes that variation in θ is irrelevant for determining optimal monetary policy.4
3 Loss Functions and Policy Regimes
As Giannoni and Woodford (2003) have shown (see also Amato and Laubach, 2004), intrinsic persistence
in a macroeconomic model of the form described in the previous section leads to lagged values of inﬂa-
tion and the output gap appearing in the social loss function: policy is inherently inertial.5 In particular,







2+ e λ(xt −δxt−1)
2¤
, (6)
where δ measures the contribution of lagged output to the loss function, and e λ is the relative weight on
the quasi-differenced output gap term vis-à-vis a similar quasi-differenced term for inﬂation. The larger
thedegreeofhabitformation, h,thegreatertherelativeweightonthequasi-differencedoutputgapterm,
e λ, and the more prominent the lag of the output gap, δ, in equation (6). On the other hand, variation in
the degree of price indexation only affects the weight on the lagged inﬂation term: e λ is independent of
ω, as in Walsh (2005).
4The micro-founded model of Walsh (2005) yields a similar result, as only inﬂation is modeled as persistent.
5AmatoandLaubach(2003)analyzesimilarmodelsthatfeatureeitherrule-of-thumbpricesettingbehaviorbyﬁrms,orrule-
of-thumb consumption choices by households — thereby inducing persistence in either the AS or AD equation, respectively —
and show that lagged values of the variable determined by the rule-of-thumb behavior appear in the social loss function.














subject to the dynamic constraints imposed by equations (4) and (5). However, as documented in Wood-
ford (2003), this loss function is only consistent with a model that lacks any persistence.6 That is, equa-
tion (7) is only the appropriate second-order approximation to social welfare when θ=0 in equation (4)
and φ = 0 in equation (5). This mismatch between the speciﬁcation of the model and of the loss func-
tion has implications for the performance of the various targeting rules studied by Jensen (2002) and
Walsh (2003), who presume λ=0.25 in their baseline speciﬁcations. These authors conduct simulations
in which the parameters of the model are varied while those of the loss function are held ﬁxed, and vice
versa; their approaches do not recognize the relationship between the model equations and loss func-
tion parameters. In section 4 we investigate the consequences of using a model-consistent loss function
versus the simple quadratic loss of equation (7).
3.1 Optimal Policy: Discretion vs. Precommitment




2e λ(xt −δxt−1)−2βe λδ(Etxt+1−δxt)+e κ`t −βe κ−1Et`t+1−β
−1e κ+1`t−1 =0 (9)
where `t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Phillips Curve constraint. Notice that in the ab-
senceofendogenouspersistencetheoptimalprecommitmentpolicystillwouldbeinertial: `t−1 isacon-
sequence of the central bank taking into account the agents’ (rational) expectations of future variables
under a credible precommitment policy.
On the other hand, the optimal policy under discretion is a simpler “leaning against the wind” rule.
In the absence of any intrinsic persistence (i.e. with h =ω=0), the optimal discretionary policy solution
lacks any inertial terms.7 In the microfounded model of section 2, however, optimal discretionary policy
6In the absence of any intrinsic persistence (i.e., h =ω=0), the loss function in equation (6) reduces to that in equation (7).






in which inertial components of policy arise endogenously from the micro-founded model. The deriva-
tions in appendix A reveal that e λ
±
e κ is decreasing in h but increasing in ω. The fact that inertia arises
endogenously in both the precommitment and discretionary policy solutions as a result of intrinsic per-
sistence plays an important role for the relative desirability of the various targeting rules we consider.
3.2 Simple Targeting Rules
Rogoff (1985) was among the ﬁrst in this literature to establish that having the central bank minimize an
objective other than the social loss function could improve economic outcomes. In the presence of aver-
age inﬂation bias from discretionary policy, per Barro and Gordon (1983), a “conservative” central bank
could more closely approach the ideal precommitment policy by placing lower weight on the output sta-
bilization objective than society’s preferences would suggest. Although discretionary policy in the model
considered here does not exhibit average inﬂation bias, stabilization bias is a potentially important is-
sue.8 Jensen (2002) shows that while a “conservative” inﬂation-targeting central bank can mitigate some
of the loss in social welfare due to stabilization bias under discretion, an inertial policy such as nominal
income growth targeting can perform better for moderate degrees of inﬂation persistence.9 Walsh (2003)
shows that for “empirically relevant” degrees of inﬂation persistence, speed limit targeting or price level
targeting can do even better in terms of minimizing the social loss in equation (7).
These various targeting rules are summarized in table 1, using the same notation as Walsh (2003).10
Noticethatonlyinﬂationtargetingisnotinertialinthesenseofinvolvinglagsofrealoutputortheoutput
gap.11 Based on analyses using a simple quadratic loss function combined with the ad hoc speciﬁcation
of persistence in equations (4) and (5), both Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) demonstrate that the last
three targeting regimes listed in table 1 outperform pure discretionary policy and “optimal” inﬂation
targeting regimes.
8Using the simple quadratic loss function of equation (7), McCallum and Nelson (2004) ﬁnd stabilization bias yields quanti-
tatively signiﬁcant welfare costs for a purely discretionary policy relative to a “timeless-perspective” one.
9A “conservative” central banker is willing to respond to a positive cost-push shock with a deeper recession, thereby stabiliz-
ing inﬂation — and inﬂation expectations — relative to the pure discretionary case.
10The relationship between targeting rules and instrument rules is beyond the scope of this paper. Clarida et al. (1999) and
Woodford (2003) show how instrument rules can be derived from targeting rules. McCallum and Nelson (2004) describe how
targeting rules can be nested within instrument rules.
11Differencing the price level targeting rule reveals its inertial nature.
7Table 1: Categorization of Targeting Regimes
Regime Loss Function Implied Rule








t +λNIGT(πt +yt −yt−1)2 πt =−
λNIGT(1+e κ)
e κ(1+λNIGT)+λNIGT (yt −yt−1)
Speed Limit Targeting SLT π2
t +λSLT(xt −xt−1)2 πt =−
λSLT
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These ﬁndings reﬂect the fact that the optimal precommitment policy takes into account the effects
on inﬂation expectations of a (credible) commitment to a future time path for monetary policy. That
is, even in the absence of any inertia in the dynamic equations for inﬂation or the output gap, the ﬁrst-
order condition for optimal precommitment involves the difference in the output gap and not just its
currentvalue,asdemonstratedinClaridaetal.(1999). Thustheﬁrst-orderconditionforprecommitment
in a non-inertial model has exactly the same form as the ﬁrst-order condition that yields the implied
policy rule for speed-limit targeting (and the ﬁrst difference of the implied rule for price-level targeting)
in the ﬁnal column of table 1. In contrast with the policy rule under IT, these inertial targeting rules
imply discretionary policy rules that resemble the precommitment ideal, which is why they mitigate the
stabilization bias problem.
In the presence of intrinsic persistence, additional inertial terms arise in the precommitment solu-
tion, as seen in equations (8) and (9). These terms appear because of the corresponding inertia in the
model-consistent social loss function. In the next section we simulate the various policy rules in this en-
vironment, and study how variation in the degree of intrinsic persistence affects the relative desirability
of the targeting rules listed in table 1. Recall that the model-consistent loss function in equation (6) only
reduces to the simple quadratic form in equation (7) if h = ω = 0 — that is, if there is no persistence in
the micro-founded model.
4 Simulation Results
Optimal policy is determined by minimizing the social loss function subject to the constraints imposed
by equations (1) and (3). Given the calibrated parameter values, numerical simulations are used to de-
8termine the optimal value of λTR, where TR = {IT, NIGT, SLT, PLT} stands for each of the targeting rules
listed in table 1 above. The corresponding social loss under each optimal policy also is computed. Simu-
lations were conducted using the solution technique of Dennis (2003), which is outlined in appendix B.
Initially we choose values for the structural parameters by examining the existing research using simi-
lar micro-founded models. We conclude this section with an alternative calibration that more closely
matches the reduced-form speciﬁcation of equations (4) and (5) used by Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003).
4.1 Baseline Calibration
Our baseline parameter values are summarized in table 2. Macroeconomic evidence on the degree of
habit formation in U.S. data generally yields values of h close to the upper limit of one: Fuhrer (2000)
estimates values between 0.8 and 0.9; Bouakez et al. (2005) estimate h to be 0.982. Dennis (2004) surveys
the literature and ﬁnds estimates of h between 0.54 and 1, while his own estimates on U.S. data are just
below our baseline assumption of 0.9. This value also lies midway between Amato and Laubach (2004),
who adopt Fuhrer’s (2000) estimate of h =0.8, and Giannoni and Woodford (2003), who assume h =1.
Estimates of the elasticity parameters for household utility, γ and η, are more diffuse. Fuhrer (2000)
estimates γ to be roughly between 6 and 13 for quarterly consumption data in a model that does not
include labor supply; Dennis (2004) estimates even larger values. On the other hand, Giannoni and
Woodford (2003) assume a value of γ of 0.16, based on Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Part of the dif-
ference may be due to a lower interest sensitivity of aggregate output than of non-durable consumption.
Bouakez et al. (2005) assume γ = 2 as they are unable to get tight estimates of that parameter in their
maximum likelihood framework; they suggest that values between 0.5 and 5 are plausible. We follow
Amato and Laubach (2004) and set our baseline value of γ to 1.1.
These values of h and γ yield a value for e σ, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, that is much
lower than the 1.5 posited by Jensen (2002) and used in Walsh (2003). (We investigate this difference
further below.) Lower values of either parameter would lead to a larger value for e σ, although our implied
value of 0.037 is broadly consistent with estimates on U.S. data by Yogo (2004) and slightly higher than
those reported by Cho and Moreno (2005).
We set the value of η, the Frisch labor supply elasticity, to 0.8 per Dennis (2004), who in turn cites es-
timates from Smets and Wouters (2003). Amato and Laubach (2004) assume η=0.6. Notice that η affects
themodelsimulationsinthreeways: itmediatestheimpactoftechnologyandaggregatedemandshocks
9Table 2: Baseline Calibration
Structural Parameters
β h γ η α ω ε
0.99 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.75 0.8 8
Implied Parameters
θ−1 θ+1 θ+2 e σ
0.333 0.997 0.330 0.037
φ−1 φ+1 e κ e κ−1 e κ+1
0.446 0.553 0.909 0.435 0.431
Exogenous Shock Processes
ρg σg ρz σz ρµ σµ
0.3 0.015 0.97 0.005 0 0.015
on the natural level of output (equation 2), it inﬂuences the slope of the Phillips curve (equation 3), and
it affects the relative weight of the output gap in the social loss function (equation 6).
On the aggregate supply side, the value of ω, the fraction of ﬁrms that index their prices to the ag-
gregate price level, determines the relative weights given to lagged inﬂation, φ−1, and expected future
inﬂation, φ+1, in equation (3). While Giannoni and Woodford (2003) assume that ω = 1 in their simula-
tions, estimates of ω are generally lower: Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005) use Bayesian methods to
estimate ω = 0.77 — close to our baseline assumption of 0.8. Cho and Moreno (2005) report FIML esti-
mates of φ+1 that are very close to our implied value of 0.553 when ω = 0.8. Not all authors ﬁnd strong
evidence of persistence in inﬂation: Galí and Gertler (1999) report GMM estimates of ω between 0.077
and 0.522, depending on the empirical speciﬁcation. Below we investigate the sensitivity of our ﬁndings
to variation in ω.
Dennis (2004) estimates the rate of non-adjustment of prices in a Calvo framework to be about 0.78;
he also notes that estimates of α tend to range between 0.63 and 0.92. A common assumption in the
literature is for prices to be ﬁxed for roughly a year on average; in a Calvo model of price setting, this
degree of stickiness would suggest α = 0.75 at a quarterly frequency. It is worth noting that evidence on
the degree of price stickiness at the ﬁrm or product level is more diffuse.
The ﬁnal structural parameter listed in table 2 is ε, the elasticity of substitution between varieties
in the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator for production. While ε does not play a direct role in the dynamics of
10aggregate demand or aggregate supply, it does inﬂuence e λ, the relative weight given to the output gap
terms in the inertial social loss function of equation (6). Our choice of ε = 8 implies an equilibrium
markup for the monopolistically competitive ﬁrms to be approximately 15%, which coincides with the
implied value of Giannoni and Woodford (2003).
Lastly, the autoregressive parameters and the standard deviations of the exogenous shock processes
are taken from Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003), in order to facilitate comparisons. Most signiﬁcantly, the
cost-push shock, which is the source of a trade-off for the stabilization objectives of monetary policy-
makers, is assumed to be serially uncorrelated. Thus, any persistence in the macroeconomic variables
following a cost-push shock is due to propagation through the intrinsic persistence channels of habit
formation and staggered price setting with indexation.
4.2 Baseline Results
Table 3 reports the simulated results for the baseline parameter values, under the assumption that for
eachpolicyregimespeciﬁcation, thecentralbankminimizesthesociallossfunctioninequation(6). The
ﬁrst column of results, labeled PC, reports the simulation results under the assumption that the cen-
tral bank were capable of fully credible precommitment. In the presence of cost-push shocks to equa-
tion(3), evena credibleprecommitmentpolicycannotcompletelystabilizeinﬂationand theoutputgap.
As it does not suffer from stabilization bias, the precommitment result forms the basis for comparison
across the various discretionary targeting regimes. The second column of results, labeled PD, reports
the simulation results for the “pure discretionary” policy; that is, if the social loss function also served to
prescribe the policy rule for the central bank. The remaining columns correspond with the optimal (i.e.
loss minimizing) policies for each targeting regime listed in table 1.
The second row of table 3 lists the “premium” resulting from stabilization bias for the discretionary
policiesweexamine,relativetothesociallossachievedunderthisprecommitmentideal. Inthethirdrow
we report the value of λTR that minimizes this inertial social loss of equation (6), for each of the targeting
regimes listed in table 2. The ﬁnal two rows of table 3 list the standard deviations of inﬂation (πt) and the
output gap (xt) that correspond to each policy regime.
In contrast with the results of both Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003), inﬂation targeting is the best dis-
cretionary policy regime in our baseline simulations, in that it comes closest to achieving the precom-
mitment value. Surprisingly, the pure discretionary policy is the next best. Speed limit and price level
11Table 3: Baseline Calibration, Inertial social loss function
Discretionary Policy Regime
PC PD IT NIGT SLT PLT
Social Loss 0.7407 0.7520 0.7470 0.7951 0.7623 0.7660
% loss relative to
precommitment
— 1.53 0.85 7.34 2.92 3.42
Optimal λTR — — 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.15
St. Dev. (πt) 0.3505 0.4710 0.4259 0.1490 0.2105 0.2123
St. Dev. (xt) 3.3627 3.3219 3.3238 3.6221 3.5372 3.5651
Social loss is multiplied by 100. Standard deviations are in percentages. For this loss
function, ω=0.8, e λ=0.1330, and δ=0.7327.
Table 4: Baseline Calibration, Simple social loss function
Discretionary Policy Regime
PC PD IT NIGT SLT PLT
Perceived Loss 2.6729 2.8591 2.7933 3.0878 2.8372 2.9192
% loss relative to
precommitment
— 6.97 4.50 15.52 6.15 9.21
Optimal λTR — — 0.18 0.11 0.34 1.01
Actual Loss 0.8683 0.8725 0.7831 1.0322 1.1079 1.0510
% loss relative to
precommitment
— 0.48 −9.81 18.88 27.59 21.04
St. Dev. (πt) 0.7422 0.9288 0.6942 0.5100 0.7055 0.7070
St. Dev. (xt) 2.9551 2.8710 3.0814 3.4053 3.1017 3.1570
Loss values are multiplied by 100. Standard deviations are in percentages. For the “per-
ceived” loss function, λ=0.25. For the “actual” loss function, ω=0.8, e λ=0.1330,
and δ=0.7327.
12targeting rank third and fourth, respectively, although the premium over the precommitment outcome
of these two targeting rules is substantially greater than that of the inﬂation targeting regime. Nominal
income growth targeting performs noticeably worse than the other policy regimes. Interestingly, table 3
suggests that for the parameterized loss function in equation (6), all three of these targeting regimes are
too aggressive in stabilizing inﬂation, at the cost of greater volatility in the output gap.
In table 4, we simulate the consequences of the central bank incorrectly perceiving the social loss
function to have the simple form in equation (7) rather than the model-consistent and inertial form in
equation (6). The values reported under “Perceived Loss” in the ﬁrst row of table 4 evaluate the different
policies under the assumption that this simple loss function is the appropriate metric. As in table 3,
inﬂation targeting is the preferred discretionary policy and the relative ranking of the targeting rules is
unchanged. However, the use of the simple but model-inconsistent loss function both to solve for the
“optimal” targeting rules and to evaluate the effects of each of these rules implies signiﬁcantly higher
values of the loss function, and much larger stabilization bias premia.
The third row of table 4 lists the values of λTR for each discretionary policy rule that minimize the
loss function in equation (7). The values of λTR are higher in table 4 than in table 3 (where λTR was cho-
sen to minimize equation 6), suggesting that the use of the simple loss function also may overstate the
appropriate weight to be placed on the non-inﬂation (or non-price level) objective for these alternative
targeting rules. This ﬁnding likely is due to the fact that for our baseline value of h — which, as argued
above, is most consistent with the empirical evidence — the weight on the output objective, e λ, in equa-
tion (6) is nearly half the λ = 0.25 typically assumed in the literature and used in table 4. Notice that
across the regimes, the standard deviation of inﬂation is uniformly higher — and the standard devia-
tion of the output gap lower — when the central bank is modeled as minimizing a simple quadratic loss
function (table 4) rather than the model-consistent one (table 3).
The model-consistent social loss function also can be used to evaluate the actual social loss that
would arise from “optimal” targeting rules derived under the incorrect speciﬁcation of the loss function.
These values are reported in the fourth row of table 4 as the “Actual Loss” for each policy. In this case IT
minimizes the model-consistent social loss — indeed, it even outperforms the precommitment policy
that is derived under the simple but incorrect loss function of equation (7). Conversely, SLT is undoubt-
edly the worst policy when evaluated in accordance with the model-consistent social loss. These results
illustrate how misspeciﬁcation of the loss function can lead to a mistaken assessment of the relative per-
13formance of different policy rules for society.
4.3 Robustness to Variation in Intrinsic Persistence
With rational, forward-looking agents, standard micro-founded New Keynesian (or New Neo-Classical
Synthesis) models do not exhibit any intrinsic persistence. In our structural model of section 2, this
standard class of models corresponds with h = ω = 0. The problem of stabilization bias occurs even in
this case, but both Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) show that the degree of inﬂation persistence in their
reduced-form speciﬁcation (φ in equation 5) affects the relative performance of the various policy rules
listedintable1. Jensen(2002)ﬁndsthatformoderatedegreesofinﬂationpersistence,thelargerthevalue
of φ in equation (5), the more favorable is NIGT relative to IT. However, once φ exceeds about
2
3, inﬂation
becomes sufﬁciently backward-looking that the time-inconsistency problem fades in importance, and
the gains from avoiding stabilization bias with NIGT disappear. Walsh (2003) reports that PLT is most
preferred for values of φ < 0.35, and that IT is most preferred for φ > 0.7, with SLT most preferred in the
“empirically relevant” middle range.
Our approach differs from those in Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) in two signiﬁcant ways. First, our
microfounded model implies that the maximum possible value for φ−1, given β = 0.99, is just above
1
2;
the larger values of φ considered by Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) are not relevant. (Recall that the
empirical estimates cited above suggest the coefﬁcient on lagged inﬂation is close to, but less than,
1
2.)
Second, our approach is cognizant of the inertial nature of the social loss function that arises endoge-
nously as a result of intrinsic persistence in inﬂation and output. This relationship accounts for much of
the differences in results between tables 3 and 4. Recognizing this linkage, Walsh (2005) also has investi-
gated the impact of varying degrees of inﬂation persistence in a micro-founded model that incorporates
the consequences of inﬂation persistence in the speciﬁcation of the social loss function.
Our paper extends the model of Walsh (2005) to explicitly consider the contribution of intrinsic per-
sistence in output as well as inﬂation.12 Recall that in our framework, changes in the degree of habit
formation not only alter the speciﬁcation of aggregate demand (equation 1), but also the output gap–
inﬂation trade-off in equation (3). Furthermore, in the model-consistent social loss function of equa-
tion (6), both δ and e λ are increasing functions of h. As a result, variation in h has a substantial effect on
12NoticethatWalsh(2005)representsaspecialcaseofourspeciﬁcationinwhich h =0. Also,Walsh(2005)doesnotinvestigate
the performance of the various discretionary targeting rules in the model with a micro-founded social welfare objective.
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Figure 1: Model-Consistent Social Loss under Precommitment, and Additional Loss due to
Stabilization Bias under Various Discretionary Policies
15the simulated social loss for our structural parameter values, and interacts with variation in ω.
Figure 1 illustrates how variation in the terms that generate intrinsic persistence, h and ω, affect
conclusions about optimal monetary policies. The upper-left plot of ﬁgure 1 quantiﬁes the social loss
under precommitment, as a function of the values of h and ω. As in table 3, equation (6) is used to
evaluate the model-consistent social loss function. As ω increases from 0 to 1, the intrinsic persistence
of inﬂation in the micro-founded model increases from φ−1 =0 to roughly φ−1 =0.5. Furthermore, both
the instantaneous elasticity of inﬂation with respect to the output gap (e κ in equation 3) and the “long-
run” elasticity (e κ−1+e κ+e κ+1) decline as ω rises. These two effects each make inﬂation less responsive to
a given change in the interest rate, thereby requiring larger policy actions — and deeper recessions —
to stabilize inﬂation in response to a µt shock. This attenuation of the central bank’s ability to stabilize
the economy results in higher values of the social loss function for the optimal (but time-inconsistent)
precommitment policy as ω rises.
Higher values of h lead to greater persistence in the output gap, as well as lower values of e σ in equa-
tion (1). These two effects would tend to make the output gap more difﬁcult to stabilize through interest
rate changes. But the degree of habit formation also has important and direct effects on the Phillips
Curve (equation 3). In our micro-founded model, higher values of h act to increase the instantaneous
output gap elasticity of consumption, which “improves” the immediate trade-off between inﬂation vari-
ability and output gap variability in response to a one-time cost-push shock, all else equal. As a result,
less aggressive policy actions are necessary to stabilize inﬂation, all else equal. In contrast, higher values
of ω, as discussed in the previous paragraph, have the opposite effect. Put another way, larger values of
h represent greater real rigidity (what King, 2000, calls “macro rigidity”) in the economy, due to the con-
sequences that habit formation in consumption have for the labor supply decisions of the optimizing
representative agent. Conversely, higher values of ω represent greater nominal rigidity in this framework
(“micro rigidity” in King, 2000), which leads to a lower value of e κ in equation (3), all else equal.13
Additionally, as h rises, the relative weight on the output gap terms, e λ, and the contribution of the
lagged output gap, δ, in the social loss function (equation 6) rise as well. Thus, under precommitment
the central bank optimally places greater weight on stabilizing the output gap as the degree of habit
persistenceincreases. e λisstronglyconvexin h,remainingbelow0.05for h lessthanabout0.7,andbelow
13Higher values for α, which measures the degree of price stickiness in a Calvo speciﬁcation, also represent greater nominal
rigidity. Walsh (2005) investigates how variation in α affects the nature of optimal policy.
160.25 for h less than 0.95. These factors, in conjunction with those mentioned in the previous paragraph,
imply that the standard deviations of inﬂation and the output gap are both monotonically declining in h
for any value of ω under the precommitment policy, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
The remaining panels in ﬁgure 1 illustrate how the values of h and ω affect the stabilization bias
from discretionary policies. The upper-right corner displays the additional loss, beyond that under the
precommitment policy, from a pure discretionary policy. The lower four panels show the incremental
loss over the precommitment solution of each of the targeting rules listed in table 1. For low values
of ω — for which there would be minimal persistence in inﬂation — the three other targeting rules all
preform better than IT. This result is especially true if h is low as well; i.e., if there is not much persistence
in the output gap, either. Conversely, for “empirically relevant” values of both h and ω — generally in the
0.8 to 0.9 range — the model-consistent social loss is lower with IT than with the other three rules.
To understand why our results differ so signiﬁcantly from others in the literature — particularly
those of Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) — we repeat the above investigation, this time with the model-
inconsistent simple social loss function of equation (7) for both the choice of the “optimal” policy and
the evaluation of the loss to society from this policy. These results are shown in ﬁgure 2.
Notice that the loss under precommitment, plotted in the upper-left panel of ﬁgure 2, is broadly
similar in shape to that in ﬁgure 1, but larger in magnitude. The main differences between the results
with the model-consistent loss function (ﬁgure 1) and those with the simple loss function (ﬁgure 2) are
in the targeting rules. In particular, inﬂation targeting is bested by SLT and PLT for most values of h and
ω, and even NIGT does better than IT over a broad range of parameter values.
However, as ﬁgure 3 demonstrates, these ﬁndings are due almost entirely to the use of the simple
model-inconsistent loss function to evaluate the loss to society under the various policy regimes. In
ﬁgure 3, the simple loss function (equation 7) still is used to determine the “optimal” policy in each
case — in effect, the central bank minimizes the wrong loss function. However, the consequences of
eachofthesepoliciesisevaluatedaccordingtothemodel-consistentlossfunctionofequation(6). Again,
the effects of variation in the intrinsic persistence parameters on the social loss under precommitment
are qualitatively similar to the prior ﬁgures, although naturally the evaluated loss tends to be higher
when“optimal”policyisdeterminedwiththesimplelossfunction(equation7)thanwiththeappropriate
model-consistent social loss (equation 6).
Most striking in ﬁgure 3 is the fact that each of the discretionary policies actually does better than
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Figure 2: Simple Loss under Precommitment, and Additional Loss due to Stabilization Bias under
Various Discretionary Policies
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Figure 3: Simple Loss under Precommitment, and Additional Loss due to Stabilization Bias under
Various Discretionary Policies, all evaluated with Model-Consistent Social Loss
19Table 5: Alternative Calibration
Structural Parameters
β h γ η α ω ε
0.99 0.9 0.0269 0.8 0.7582 0.9901 8
Implied Parameters
θ−1 θ+1 θ+2 e σ
0.333 0.997 0.330 1.5
φ−1 φ+1 e κ e κ−1 e κ+1
0.5 0.5 0.05 0.009 0.009
precommitment for some values of h and ω: the precommitment policy that minimizes the simple loss
functionissoinferiorfromthestandpointofthemodel-consistentsociallossthatinstructingthecentral
bank to follow one of the targeting rules under discretion actually can yield better outcomes. However,
thevarioustargetingrulesarenotsymmetricintheirabilitytoimproveuponthesuboptimalprecommit-
ment policy. In particular, IT dramatically out-performs not only precommitment but also all the other
targeting rules when ω exceeds roughly 0.6 (φ−1 larger than roughly 0.36). For the “empirically relevant”
ranges of h and ω, the social loss with SLT or PLT is about twice that with IT. Thus, IT is more robust to
this particular type of mispeciﬁcation than the alternative targeting regimes, which tend to exacerbate
the social loss in the empirically relevant region.
4.4 Alternative Calibration and Results
As an alternative to our baseline parameter values in table 2, we also consider parameter values chosen
to match as closely as possible the reduced-form speciﬁcation of the model simulated by Walsh (2003).
These values are shown in table 5. The main difference with respect to the baseline values in table 2 is
the much smaller value for γ. Given h = 0.9 and β = 0.99, this value of γ is necessary to match the value
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1.5 in Walsh (2003) (as well as Jensen, 2002). As noted in
table 5, these values of β and h yield an estimate of θ−1 no larger than one-third, well below the assumed
value of θ=0.5 in equation (4) of both Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003).
The second main difference between the parameter values in table 5 versus table 2 is the value of ω.
In order to match the coefﬁcient on lagged inﬂation (φ−1) of 0.5, we had to choose a value for ω that was
20nearly one. As a result, we also had to assume a slightly higher value for α in order to match the value
of e κ = 0.05 on the output gap in the aggregate supply relationship. The remaining structural parameter
values are the same as in table 2. Our objective in this exercise is to replicate the speciﬁcation of the
dynamic equations in Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) as closely as possible given the micro-foundations
of the model, while changing the fewest number of parameters from our baseline speciﬁcation.
Table 6 reports the losses under precommitment and each of the discretionary policies, under the
assumption that each optimal policy is chosen to minimize the model-consistent social loss of equa-
tion (6). That is, the results in table 6 parallel those in table 3, but for the alternative calibration given in
table 5. Note that for those values, chosen to match the reduced-form model equations of Jensen (2002)
and Walsh (2003) as closely as possible, the parameterized model-consistent social loss function looks
very different than the simple loss function assumed by those authors. For example, the lagged inﬂa-
tion rate does not enter equation (7), whereas the assumption of ω = 0.9901 — necessary to make the
reduced-form inﬂation persistence φ−1 = 0.5 — implies a high degree of inﬂation inertia in the model-
consistent loss. Similarly, the lagged output gap does not enter equation (7), whereas the parameter
values in table 5 imply δ = 0.1844 in equation (6). Finally, while Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) assume
that λ = 0.25 in equation (7), the above parameter values imply a substantially lower value of e λ = 0.012
for equation (6).
Even under this alternative parameterization, inﬂation targeting remains the discretionary policy
regime that comes closest to the precommitment ideal. Indeed, in this case stabilization bias is nearly
absent. Table 6 reveals SLT, NIGT, and PLT to be the next-best policies, in that order, although there is a
sizable difference between the social loss under each of these policies and the loss under IT.
Conversely, when the simple loss function is used both to determine the loss-minimizing policy and
to evaluate that policy, we are able to reproduce the qualitative results of Walsh (2003), in which IT ap-
pears much worse than SLT or PLT: compare the perceived losses from the simple loss function in the
ﬁrst row of table 7. In this case, SLT appears very close to the precommitment loss, and IT appears to
perform dramatically worse. But when the model-consistent social loss is used to evaluate the policies
chosenunderthesimplelossfunction,therankingisnearlyreversed: theactuallossfromITisquiteabit
lower than that from SLT, which itself is bested by both NIGT and PLT. (See the fourth row of table 7.) The
use of the simple but model-inconsistent loss function leads to fundamentally different — and arguably
incorrect — conclusions about the relative desirability of the targeting rules we consider here, just as in
21Table 6: Alternative Calibration, Inertial social loss function
Discretionary Policy Regime
PC PD IT NIGT SLT PLT
Social Loss 3.9803 4.9451 3.9817 4.2554 4.2178 4.2884
% loss relative to
precommitment
— 24.24 0.04 6.91 5.97 7.74
Optimal λTR — — 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
St. Dev. (πt) 1.5803 11.9802 1.5574 1.2962 1.3168 1.4125
St. Dev. (xt) 12.6784 13.6882 12.9150 13.7326 13.5182 13.4204
Social loss is multiplied by 100. Standard deviations are in percentages. For this loss function,
ω=0.9901, e λ=0.0120, and δ=0.1844.
Table 7: Alternative Calibration, Simple social loss function
Discretionary Policy Regime
PC PD IT NIGT SLT PLT
Perceived Loss 12.8790 18.0070 15.4680 16.8214 12.9442 14.0950
% loss relative to
precommitment
— 39.82 20.10 30.61 0.51 9.44
Optimal λTR — — 0.10 0.89 0.73 2.59
Actual Loss 6.0674 6.2579 5.4657 5.5500 6.0189 5.8486
% loss relative to
precommitment
— 3.14 −9.92 −8.53 −0.80 −3.61
St. Dev. (πt) 2.9640 4.0475 3.2243 2.3941 2.9676 3.1110
St. Dev. (xt) 4.2039 2.9302 4.6553 6.8038 4.2173 4.4411
Loss values are multiplied by 100. Standard deviations are in percentages. For the “perceived”
loss function, λ=0.25. For the “actual” loss function, ω=0.9901, e λ=0.0120, and δ=0.1844.
22table 4 above. These results overturn those in the existing published literature.
4.5 Interpretation
The above results demonstrate that conclusions about the desirability of the monetary policy targeting
rules we consider are sensitive to various modeling assumptions. First, the speciﬁcation of the loss func-
tion itself has a substantial effect on the extent of stabilization bias in the simulations. Second, any rank-
ingofthepolicyrulesdependsuponthemagnitudesoftherelativeweightsinthesocialwelfarefunction,
which in turn depend on the structural parameter values. In particular, we ﬁnd evidence against the su-
periority of simple inertial targeting rules like NIGT or SLT — as advocated by Jensen (2002) or Walsh
(2003), for example — once the speciﬁcation of the social loss function is derived from a micro-founded
model featuring intrinsic persistence. Indeed, for empirically plausible degrees of inﬂation persistence,
a discretionary IT regime appears to closely match the precommitment ideal.
Recall that, in the absence of any persistent dynamics, a pure discretionary policy would still suffer
from stabilization bias. Under discretion a policy maker takes the expectations of the public as given,
and is incapable of credibly committing to a future path of policy in a manner that can convince the
public to set its expectations of future inﬂation accordingly. Thus, Clarida et al. (1999), for example,
have demonstrated that the ﬁrst-order condition that describes the optimal precommitment policy in a
basic New Keynesian model (i.e., one lacking persistence) sets the inﬂation rate as a function of the one-
period change in the output gap, rather than as a function of the contemporaneous output gap alone as
in the optimal discretionary policy case. This lag of the output gap appears in the ﬁrst-order condition
for precommitment as a consequence of a credible central bank’s ability to inﬂuence the formation of
inﬂation expectations. Such a precommitment policy, however, is not time consistent.
By incorporating a lagged value of the real activity objective (either output or the output gap) into
the policy rule, the ﬁrst-order conditions under discretion for the targeting rules other than IT in table 1
resemble those under precommitment, and in particular, exhibit a form of history dependence. Table 1
summarizes the implied rules derived from the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal discretionary policy
under each targeting regime: as noted in section 3, NIGT, SLT and PLT all have lagged output (yt−1)
or output gap (xt−1) terms. Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) demonstrate that for a moderate degree of




2 in equation 5), the stabilization bias
underpurediscretion—andunderinﬂationtargeting—worsensrelativetotheothertargetingrules. We
23ﬁnd similar results, as can be seen when comparing the “Preceived Loss” values reported in table 7. In a
similiar vein, notice that with our micro-founded calibration as illustrated in ﬁgure 2, the gap between
the losses under pure discretion or IT and the other targeting rules are increasing in ω for h =0.
Introducing intrinsic persistence into the model changes the speciﬁcation of the loss function signif-
icantly from the simple quadratic form of equation 7 that is commonly assumed in the literature. Thus,
the appropriate ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal policy differ as well, as highlighted in section 3. Equa-
tions (8) and (9) reveal the lack of a closed-form expression for the form of optimal precommitment
policy once both sources of persistence are introduced. Nonetheless, we can glean some insight into
the relative performance of the various targeting rules by noting ﬁrst that the other three targeting rules
tend to over-stabilize inﬂation at the cost of output gap variability. Implicitly, by ﬁxing a weight of one
on the lagged output (gap) term, these targeting rules appear to be “overweighting” xt−1 relative to its
actual weight in the social loss function of δ < 1. To compensate, these other targeting rules tend to un-
derweighttheoutputstabilizationobjective, leadingtoa sociallysub-optimaldegreeofvariabilityinreal
activity. For the baseline calibration illustrated in table 3, such policies lead to higher social losses than
with precommitment — or with inﬂation targeting.
The ﬂip side of this analysis comes into play as ω approaches one. In that case, the difference of
inﬂation rather than the level enters into the social loss function and thus the speciﬁcation of the op-
timal precommitment policy. The other targeting rules link the level of inﬂation to the ﬁrst difference
of the output gap, but when inﬂation is intrinsically highly inertial, the difference of inﬂation should re-
spond to the difference in the output gap (to a ﬁrst approximation). The ﬁrst difference of the implied
targeting rule for IT more closely resembles the optimal precommitment policy in the case of relatively
high inﬂation persistence; differencing the other targeting rules effectively over-differences the output
gap terms. In this sense, there is an intuitive parallel between the performance of PLT in the standard,
non-presistentmodelandtheperformanceofITintheintrinsicallypersistentmodel. Recallthattheﬁrst
differenceofPLTyieldsacloseapproximationofﬁrst-orderconditionforoptimalprecommitmentinthe
absence of inﬂation persistence (see, e.g., Walsh, 2003); with an empirically-plausible degree of inﬂa-
tion persistence arising intrinsically in the micro-founded model, the ﬁrst difference of IT more closely
approximates the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition for optimal precommitment in the presence of
inﬂation persistence than do any of the other targeting rules we consider.
This result can be seen in the case of our baseline calibration, in which
e κ−1
e κ ≈ φ−1 and
e κ+1
e κ ≈ φ+1. In
24this case — which holds over a relatively wide range of (h, ω) pairs given the other parameter values —
the lag polynomials on the Langrange multiplier `t in equations (8) and (9) are approximately equal.









For values of δ in the neighborhood of ω, quasi-differencing the implied targeting rule for IT very closely
approximatesthisequation. Moregenerally, whenωislow, thelevelofinﬂationappearsontheleft-hand
side of equation (11) and the other targeting rules perform relatively well, as shown in ﬁgure 1. When ω
is relatively high, IT outperforms the other targeting rules.
5 Conclusion
Theevaluationofoptimalmonetarypolicyinthefaceofmacroeconomicpersistencehasreceivedsignif-
icant attention recently. Following others in the literature, in this paper we make persistence an intrinsic
part of a “New Keynesian” dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model by incorporating habit forma-
tion in consumption and price indexation by ﬁrms. In this framework, both the log-linearized equations
for the model dynamics and the second-order approximation to the social loss function vary with the
structural parameters that determine the extent of intrinsic persistence. The speciﬁcation and calibra-
tion of this micro-founded model has important consequences for the relative desirability of various
targeting rules for monetary policy.
In a discretionary policy environment, uncertainty about the central bank’s willingness to deliver
on past promises for the future path of policy yields a problem of “stabilization bias,” in which private
agents’ expectations about subsequent inﬂation rates are higher than they would be under a credible —
but time-inconsistent — precommitment policy. Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) have suggested that
inertial policies, such as nominal income growth targeting or price-level targeting, address this problem
better than inﬂation targeting. Our simulations reveal their results to be a direct consequence of the ad
hoc nature of persistence and simple speciﬁcation of the social loss function that they use.
In contrast, use of the appropriate model-consistent loss function yields inﬂation targeting as the
best discretionary policy of those considered. We obtain these results both with a calibration based on
a review of the empirical evidence as well as with another chosen to replicate the persistent dynamics
25of Jensen (2002) or Walsh (2003) as closely as possible. This model-consistent speciﬁcation of the social
loss function features inertial terms in both inﬂation and the output gap stabilization objectives. This
inertia arises endogenously from the same model assumptions that generate intrinsic persistence in the
inﬂation and output gap equations.
The need for coherence between the social loss function and the rest of the model speciﬁcation has
been emphasized by several authors recently, including Amato and Laubach (2003, 2004), Giannoni and
Woodford (2003), and Woodford (2003). In a micro-founded model with inﬂation persistence, Walsh
(2005) has demonstrated how misspeciﬁcation of the policy objectives of the central bank affects deter-
mination of the optimal monetary policy and the evaluation of the social loss from such policies. Our
approach is similar, although by adding intrinsic persistence in real activity, we can extend his results. In
contrast with models of ad hoc persistence in the output gap, variation in the degree of habit formation
affects the inﬂation dynamics and the relative weights on current and lagged values of the output gap in
the objective function. Variation in this source of persistence is shown to impact more signiﬁcantly the
relative performance of various targeting rules than does inﬂation persistence alone.
While our speciﬁc results depend upon a particular set of assumptions for the micro-foundations of
our model, any framework that features intrinsic persistence in inﬂation and output likely will feature
endogenous inertial in the model-consistent speciﬁcation of the social welfare function as well. In such
a case, the relationship among the ﬁrst-order conditions that describe optimal discretionary policy for
eachofthetargetingregimesislikelytofavorinﬂationtargetingifthemodeliscalibratedtothedegreeof
persistence observed in U.S. data. Recent work by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005),
amongst others, have introduced additional frictions and potential sources of persistence that could
impact the relative performance of the targeting rules we examine. Given the increasing popularity of
inﬂation targeting regimes around the globe, additional research into these issues seems warranted.
26A Model Speciﬁcation
Our investigation utilizes what has become the workhorse model for monetary policy analysis, a micro-
founded “New Keynesian” model with business cycle dynamics due to less than perfectly ﬂexible prod-
uct prices. We draw extensively upon previous work in this area by Giannoni and Woodford (2003) and
Woodford (2003), and summarize the key components of the model below.14




















subject to their intertemporal budget constraint. Ct, Nt, and Dt represent consumption, labor supply,
anddebtholdingsattime t,respectively. Equation(A1)includeslaggedconsumptioninthespeciﬁcation
of utility: h ∈[0, 1] measures the extent of habit persistence in consumption.
The log-linearized version of the Euler equation that follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions of the
consumer’s maximization problem has the form:
e ct =Et e ct+1− e γ
−1(it −Etπt+1), (A2)
where e ct is deﬁned as:
e ct =(ct −hct−1)−βh(Etct+1−hct), (A3)
and ct is the log of consumption. e γ = γ
±
(1−βh) measures the sensitivity of consumption to the real
interest rate; γ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption. Notice that
in the absence of habit formation, h = 0 and equation (A2) reduces to the consumption Euler equation
commonly found in the literature that lacks endogenous persistence in consumption.
Assumingthegovernmentconsumesaﬁxedshareofoutput,subjecttomeanzero(inlogs)stochastic
disturbances, equation (A2) can be re-written in terms of real output:
e yt =Et e yt+1− e γ
−1(it −Etπt+1)+Et e gt+1− e gt . (A4)
The expected change in e g, the (transformed) innovation to ﬁscal policy, acts as an aggregate demand
14Additional details on the model derivation are available from the authors upon request.
27shock in this speciﬁcation. Here, e yt and e gt are deﬁned analogously to e ct in equation (A3).15
To rewrite equation (A4) in terms of the output gap requires a model of aggregate supply. We assume
asimplelinearproductionfunction, yt = zt+nt (inlogterms),inwhichthecommontechnologicalshock,
zt, is assumed to follow an exogenous ﬁrst-order autoregressive process.16 Equating labor demand and
labor supply under ﬂexible prices yields an implicit relationship for the natural level of real output:
ηy
n
t + e γ e y
n
t =(1+η)zt − e γ e gt , (A5)
where e yn
t also is deﬁned analogously to e ct in equation (A3).
With equation (A5) we can express equation (A4) in terms of the (transformed) output gap, e xt ≡ e yt −
e yn
t :





t is the corresponding natural or “Wicksellian” real rate of interest, deﬁned as:
r
n






t +Et e gt+1− e gt
¢
. (A7)
To facilitate comparison with the ad hoc persistent aggregate demand formulation of equation (4),
we can expand the deﬁnition of e xt in equation (A6) using the transformation of equation (A3) and the
law of iterated expectations to give:
























Returning to the supply side of the model, ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive price setters for
their differentiated products. We assume Calvo-type nominal price rigidity with α being the probability
thataﬁrmdoesnotadjustitspriceinagivenperiod. Thus, theaveragepriceisﬁxedfor1/(1−α)periods.
We augment this speciﬁcation by assuming that a proportion ω of ﬁrms who do not adjust in a period
index their prices to the aggregate price level. This additional assumption yields persistence in the New-
15We model the exogenous ﬁscal process as gt =ρg gt−1+ζ
g
t , with ζ
g
t ∼(0, σ2
g) and 0≤ρg <1.
16That is, the technology shock is modeled as zt =ρz zt−1+ζz
t , with ζz
t ∼(0, σ2
z) and 0≤ρz <1.
28Keynesian Phillips Curve via a lagged inﬂation term:
πt =φ−1πt−1+φ+1Etπt+1+e κxt −e κ−1xt−1−e κ+1Etxt+1+µt , (A9)
where φ−1 =
ω
1+ωβ and φ+1 =
β





1+ωβ measurestheresponseofinﬂationtovariationintheoutputgap; e κ−1 = e κe γh
±
(η+
e γ) and e κ+1 = e κβe γh
±
(η+ e γ) measure the contributions, respectively, of lagged and expected output gaps
for current inﬂation. The cost-push shock, µt, can be derived as a stochastic deviation from the steady-
state monopolistic markup or taxes as in Steinsson (2003). We assume that the cost-push shock also
follows an exogenous stationary ﬁrst-order autoregressive process.17
For ω=0 the lagged inﬂation term disappears from equation (A9) and φ+1 equals β, as in the canon-
ical forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve. However, habit formation in consumption yields a
micro-founded Phillips Curve with both Etxt+1 and xt−1 on the right-hand side of equation (A9), even in
the absence of any intrinsic persistence in inﬂation. Only if h = 0 and ω = 0 does equation (A9) reduce
to the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve derived from a Calvo price-setting framework. Thus this
price setting relationship also is qualitatively different than the ad hoc speciﬁcation in equation (5), and
cannot be reconciled with the micro-foundational model for permissible parameter values.
GiannoniandWoodford(2003)andWoodford(2003)demonstratethatthesecond-orderapproxima-












ϑ measures the contribution of lagged output to the loss function, and e λ =
ϑe γe κ(1+ωβ)
ε(η+e γ) is the
relative weight on the quasi-differenced output gap term vis-à-vis a similar quasi-differenced term for
inﬂation.18 Notice that the larger the degree of habit formation, the greater the relative weight on the
quasi-differencedoutputgapterm,andthemoreprominentthelagoftheoutputgapinequation(6). On
the other hand, variation in the degree of price indexation only affect the weight on the lagged inﬂation
17Formally, we assume µt = ρµµt−1 +ζ
µ
t , with ζ
µ
t ∼ (0, σ2
µ) and 0 ≤ ρµ < 1. The cost-push shock represents deviations to
the relationship between real marginal cost and the output gap, and conceptually should be multiplied by e κ/(η+ e γ). In the
simulations below we calibrate the standard deviation of this composite term to be a constant, consistent with Jensen (2002)









is a composite of the structural parameters, with χ =
η+e γ(1+βh2)
βe γ . This speciﬁcation of the loss
function is conditioned upon the distortions associated with monopolistic competition being arbitrarily close to zero.
29term: e λ is independent of ω, as in Walsh (2005).19
B Solution Algorithm for Simulations
To investigate the nature of optimal policy under both precommitment and discretion, and to better
understand how the optimal policy solutions are sensitive to the model speciﬁcation, we use computa-
tional techniques to simulate the model. In particular, we use a version of the technique developed by
Dennis (2003) for ﬁnding optimal policy in rational expectations models that involve both expectational
leads and lags of the endogenous variables.20 The solution technique proceeds as follows: ﬁrst, collect
the relevant dynamic equations of section 2, as well as any identities necessary to close the model, into
the following matrix representation of the structural model:21
A0yt =A1yt−1+A2Etyt+1+A3xt +A4Etxt+1+A5vt , (B1)
where yt is the (n×1) vector of endogenous variables and xt represents the (p×1) vector of policy vari-
ables. In the simulations reported below, the nominal interest rate, it, is assumed to be the sole instru-
ment of policy (i.e., p = 1). The three structural shocks in the model — the aggregate demand shock, gt,
the technology shock, zt, and the cost-push shock, µt — are included in the yt vector and assumed to















t ) is distributed as:
vt ∼ iid(0,Ω Ω Ω),




19We compute the values of the social loss function under different targeting rules using the method discussed in appendix B.
Adam and Billi(2005) discuss a monotonic transformation toconvertthesevalues intoconsumption units. As weareinterested
in the relative performance of each policy regime, our results are invariant to the units in which the losses are expressed.
20The simulations were computed with code written by the authors for MATLAB version 7 (release 14).
21Theprimaryequationsofthesimulationare(1)and(3),alongwiththedeﬁnitionsoftheﬂexible-priceequilibriumvariables
in equations (A5) and (A7). The deﬁnitions for the “quasi-differenced” variables, as in equation (A3), are included as well.












The central bank then optimally chooses xt to solve the above linear-quadratic problem, subject to the
constraints summarized in equation (B1).
While we report both the optimal precommitment and various optimal discretionary policies in the
main text, we are most interested in the discretionary solutions. In this case, a stationary solution to the
model has the form:
yt =H1yt−1+H2vt (B3)
xt =F1yt−1+F2vt , (B4)
where equation (B3) deﬁnes the dynamic updating equation for the variables in the model, and equa-
tion(B4)representsthe(implicit)policyruleasafunctionofthe“state”variables(namely,theexogenous
disturbances and the lagged endogenous variables.)












































in moving average form.
31References
Adam, Klaus and Roberto M. Billi, “Discretionary Monetary Policy and the Zero Lower Bound on Nom-
inal Interest Rates,” November 2005. Forthcoming, Journal of Monetary Economics.
Amato, Jeffery D. and Thomas Laubach, “Rule-of-Thumb Behaviour and Monetary Policy,” European
Economic Review, October 2003, 47 (5), 791–831.
and , “Implications of Habit Formation for Optimal Monetary Policy,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, March 2004, 51 (2), 305–325.
Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon, “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,”
Journal of Political Economy, August 1983, 91 (4), 589–610.
Bouakez, Hafedh, Emanuela Cardia, and Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, “Habit Formation and the Persis-
tence of Monetary Shocks,” Journal of Monetary Economics, September 2005, 52 (6), 1073–1088.
Cho, Seonghoon and Antonio Moreno, “A Small Sample Study of the New-Keynesian Macro Model,”
September 2005. Manuscript.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans, “Nominal Rigidities and the Dy-
namic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy,” Journal of Political Economy, February 2005, 113 (1),
1–45.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler, “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Per-
spective,” Journal of Economic Literature, December 1999, 37 (4), 1661–1707.
Dennis, Richard, “Optimal Policy Rules in Rational Expectations Models: New Solution Algorithms,”
January 2003. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper #2001-09.
, “Specifying and Estimating New Keynesian Models with Instrument Rules and Optimal Monetary
Policy,” September 2004. Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco Working Paper #2004-17.
andUlfSöderström,“HowImportantisPrecommitmentforMonetaryPolicy?,”September2002. Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper #2002-10.
32Fuhrer, Jeffrey C., “Habit Formation in Consumption and Its Implications for Monetary-Policy Models,”
American Economic Review, June 2000, 90 (3), 367–390.
Galí, Jordi and Mark Gertler, “Inﬂation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric Analysis,” Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, October 1999, 44 (2), 195–222.
Giannoni, Marc P. and Michael Woodford, “Optimal Inﬂation Targeting Rules,” August 2003. Columbia
University manuscript.
Goodfriend, Marvin and Robert King, “The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of Monetary Pol-
icy,” in Ben Bernanke and Julio Rotemberg, eds., NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 1997, pp. 231–283.
Jensen, Henrik, “Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inﬂation?,” American Economic Review, Septem-
ber 2002, 92 (4), 928–956.
King, Robert G., “The New IS-LM Model: Language, Logic, and Limits,” Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond Economic Quarterly, Summer 2000, 86 (3), 45–103.
McCallum, Bennett T. and Edward Nelson, “Timeless Perspective vs. Discretionary Monetary Policy in
Forward-Looking Models,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April 2004, 86 (2), 43–56.
Rabanal, Pau and Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez, “Comparing New Keynesian Models of the Business Cycle: A
Bayesian Approach,” Journal of Monetary Economics, September 2005, 52 (6), 1151–1166.
Rogoff, Kenneth, “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, November 1985, 100 (4), 1169–1189.
Rotemberg, Julio J. and Michael Woodford, “An Optimizing-Based Econometric Model for the Evalua-
tion of Monetary Policy,” in Ben S. Bernanke and Julio J. Rotemberg, eds., NBER Macroeconomic An-
nual, Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1997, pp. 297–346.
Smets, Frank and Raf Wouters, “An Estimated Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of the
Euro Area,” Journal of the European Economic Association, September 2003, 1 (5), 1123–1175.
Steinsson, Jón, “Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy with Inﬂation Persistence,” Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, October 2003, 50 (7), 1425–1456.
33Walsh, Carl E., “Speed Limit Policies: The Output Gap and Optimal Monetary Policy,” American Eco-
nomic Review, March 2003, 93 (1), 265–278.
, “Endogenous Objectives and the Evaluation of Targeting Rules for Monetary Policy,” Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, July 2005, 52 (5), 889–911.
Woodford, Michael, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2003.
Yogo, Motohiro, “Estimating the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution When Instruments Are Weak,”
The Review of Economics and Statistics, August 2004, 86 (3), 797–810.
34